The problem of scientific representation

In this episode we discuss the problem of representation: in virtue of what does something represent something else? A plausible account should be able to provide understanding of how representation operates.  We explore the classical accounts of similarity and structuralism, as well as their shortcomings using the example of DNA.    Some references:   Bueno, Otávio, 1997, “Empirical Adequacy: A Partial Structure Approach”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 28(4): 585–610. doi:10.1016/S0039-3681(97)00012-5 Contessa, Gabriele, 2007, “Scientific Representation, Interpretation, and Surrogative Reasoning”, Philosophy of Science, 74(1): 48–68. doi:10.1086/519478 French, Steven, 2003, “A Model-Theoretic Account of Representation (or, I Don’t Know Much About Art…But I Know It Involves Isomorphism)”, Philosophy of Science, 70(5): 1472–83. doi:10.1086/377423 Frigg, Roman, 2002, “Models and Representation: Why Structures Are Not Enough”, Measurement in Physics and Economics Project Discussion Paper Series, DP MEAS 25/02. Goodman, Nelson, 1972, “Seven Strictures on Similarity”, in Problems and Projects, Nelson Goodman (ed.), Indianapolis and New York: Bobs-Merril, 437–46. Suárez, Mauricio, 2003, “Scientific Representation: Against Similarity and Isomorphism”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 17(3): 225–44.